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  In a recent article Smith and Yates (2003) ask the question “Should Consumers Be Priced 
Out of Pollution-Permit Markets?” They answer that question with a definite yes. The reasoning 
they give for their conclusion is that in a two-sided markets (in which consumers can decrease 
the number of permits) such as are found in the EPA’s acid-rain program, the existence of a 
consumer who wants to retire permits is proof that the number of permits is too large because it 
exceeds the socially optimal amount. While there are many useful insights in Smith and Yates’ 
paper, they are wrong in their major claim that a two-sided pollution permit market offers “an 
easily observable indicator of inefficiency even when the regulator has imperfect information 
about the costs and benefits of pollution”
1 (p.182)  
  I believe the problem with their argument is worth pointing out because their claim about 
the information advantage of two-sided permit markets is a strong one. If it were correct, their 
paper has relevance far beyond economic pedagogy; it would make a major contribution to 
applied economic theory. Specifically, if their argument is correct, it leads to the conclusion that 
two-sided markets are always preferable to one-sided permit markets, because of the extra 
information gained from the two-sided market, and that any permit market should be set up as a 
two-sided, rather than a one-sided, market. That proposition has specific applications, as they 
point out in their paper. For example if they are correct it means, as they explicitly conclude, that 
regulatory agencies such as the EPA should strive to “issue permit levels that price consumers 
completely out of the market.” (p. 182) 
  In explaining why they are wrong in their claim, I point out that while, in a very rarified 
model, information about the optimal number of permits might be gained from a “symmetric 
two-sided market” (which is essentially a market in the quantity of permits that will be allowed), 
generally, because of transactions costs and public goods problems, no useful information can be 
gained from such markets. 
  My argument is a simple one, and is based on the observation that what Smith and Yates 
call a two-sided market only allows individuals to reduce the number of permits; it is more 
correctly called an asymmetric two-sided market. This is a problem because for a two-sided 
market to provide information about social efficiency, that market would have to allow 
individuals to both increase and decrease the number of pollution permits. The reason 
individuals might want to increase the number of pollution permits need not be that they prefer 
                                                 
1 Their paper serves a number of useful pedagogical roles in explaining permit markets to students. One useful 
insight is their argument that while one-sided markets (in which the quantity of permits is set and cannot be 
changed by participants) attain a type of productive efficiency, these markets will not attain “full social efficiency” 
unless the permit-issuing agency happens to issue the socially efficient number of permits. Another useful insight 
is their argument social efficiency can occur only if the agency has perfect information about the costs and benefits 
of pollution, which the agency will never have. A Note on Information and Pollution Permit Markets 
more pollution per se; it could be that they are helped by the actions that a greater number of 
pollution permits would allow more than they are hurt by the pollution.  
The demand to increase the number of permits is most likely to be expressed by firms 
acting as agents for their consumers. This demand to increase the number of permits is not 
captured by the standard marginal abatement cost curve that expresses the price a firm would pay 
for a permit; the demand to increase the number of permits is not the demand for permits. The 
price the firm would pay to increase the number of permits would be equal to the price of permits 
only if the number of permits is set at a socially optimal level. My point is that this demand to 
increase pollution permits must be taken into account before one can draw any information from 
consumers’ behavior in retiring pollution permits relevant to social efficiency of the number of 
permits.  
  Let me give an example. Say the government follows Smith and Yates’ policy and 
decreases the number of permits because there is a demand by one consumer to decrease the 
number of permits. Doing so will raise the price of the goods, the production of which caused 
that pollution. In doing so it would harm those people who would prefer the existing price of the 
good or a lower price for the good and who would be willing to accept the pollution associated 
with the current production, or higher production if it lowered the price of the good sufficiently.  
According to Smith and Yates, decreasing permits will definitely improve social 
efficiency because, according to them, the existence of any demand to decrease permits provides 
information that the number of permits is too high. However, assume that at the existing price, 
there are 100,000 people who would have been willing to pay to increase the number of permits 
and accept the higher level of pollution because they value the lower price of the good of that 
pollution-causing good more than they were hurt by the pollution. In Smith and Yates’ 
asymmetric two-sided market these people have no way of revealing their demand, since Smith 
and Yates’ asymmetric two-sided market provides them no method of increasing the number of 
permits.
2  
  The issue can be seen more clearly if one thinks not of a single pollution permit market--
what they call a two-sided pollution permit market--but of a two-part market—one market in 
pollution rights in which firms trade given a set number of permits, and a second separate market 
whose role is to determine the number of pollution permits in existence. When one thinks of the 
problem as a two market problem, it is obvious that in this second market there will be both a 
supply of permits by individuals who are willing to pay for an increase in the quantity of permits 
(and hence pay a lower price for the good they want), and a demand for permits by individuals 
who are willing to pay for a decrease in the quantity of permits, and hence pay a higher price for 
the good they want. (I speak of individuals rather than consumers because the issue is not one of 
consumers versus producers, but of consumers of the goods produced by firms and of consumers 
affected by the pollution that the production of goods causes; producers are simply operating as 
                                                 
2 In practice there are methods of increasing the number of permits even if it not explicitly allowed. For example, it 
can be done through lobbying government, or through programs that allow pollution credits for alternative 
activities. My point is that in order to draw any information about “social optimality” from agents’ activities, as 
Smith and Yates are attempting to do, all such methods would have to be taken into account, and one cannot 
simply look for the existence of any demand to increase permits, which is what Smith and Yates say you can do.  
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proxies for those consumers who want the products the production of which causes the 
pollution.)  
  Efficiency in the number of permits can be judged on the basis of equilibrium in that 
second market. Assuming no public goods problems (as Smith and Yates did in their initial 
model), and no transactions costs, as is generally assumed, the price of creating or destroying 
permits (the price in the first market) would have to be equal to the price of an additional unit of 
pollution created (the price in the second market) for there to be social efficiency. Put another 
way, the price of changing the number of permits would equal the price of the permits 
themselves. A symmetric two-sided market appropriate for social welfare analysis would be a 
market in which these two markets are combined and individuals are allowed to increase or 
decrease the number of permits at the existing price as well as buy and sell the permits to others.  
  That is not the nature of the two-sided market Smith and Yates assume. Their two-sided 
market is asymmetric; it allows only those who want to decrease the number of permits to reveal 
their demand; it allows no expression of demand for those who want to increase the number of 
permits. This asymmetric market price is not useful in finding a social optimum since it has 
given no means of expression to those who want to increase the number of permits. Without that 
revealed demand one does not know whether the actual quantity of permits issues is above or 
below the optimal quantity. Thus, contrary to Smith and Yates’ conclusion, one cannot say that 
in this market “if consumers actually purchase permits, it indicates that the market equilibrium is 
inefficient.”  
  One can see the lack of symmetry in the assumed two-sided markets of Smith and Yates 
by considering their expository model that relates the marginal abatement cost curve with the 
marginal damage curve for the case of many firms and a single consumer. (p. 183) They discuss 
the situation in which they assume the quantity of permits has been set too high and correctly 
point out that, in the model, given this assumption, allowing consumers to retire permits will 
allow a movement of the quantity of permits toward the optimum level. They further correctly 
argue that the consumers will continue to do so until the supply intersects at the same place as 
does the marginal damage and marginal abatement cost.  
  The lack of symmetry occurs because the market they assume does not allow adjustment 
if the quantity of permits is set too low. As they point out, under their assumptions when the 
quantity of permits is set too low, the market will remain inefficient. (Pg. 184) But this is a 
serious problem for them because their central argument is that government can use agent’s 
actions to obtain information about whether the quantity of permits is too high or too low. Since 
agents who think the quantity is too low are not allowed to reveal their demand, we cannot 
deduce from the fact that some people think the quantity of permits is too high, that that socially 
efficient quantity is too high, which is what they are claiming to be able to do.  
A complete market in permit quantities (a symmetric two-sided market) would 
theoretically solve that problem since it would allow an increase or a decrease in the number of 
permits to the optimal level. In a symmetric two-sided market individuals would have a way to 
increase permits if they are willing to pay the going price of the permit in the same way that 
individuals could reduce them in an asymmetric two-sided market.  
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  Using the same reasoning as did Smith and Yates in the case of the consumer and an 
oversupply, if the quantity of permits is set too low, the firm (One firm is assumed to avoid the 
public goods problem as was the case with the consumer.) would bid to increase the number of 
permits, moving the equilibrium to the social optimum where the quantity of permits intersected 
at the same point where the marginal damage and the marginal abatement cost curves intersect. 
Thus, with a symmetric two-sided market in Smith and Yates’ model, regardless of whether 
quantity of permits is set too high or two low, that quantity of permits will adjust to the 
equilibrium quantity. The only effect of setting the initial quantity too high or too low would be a 
wealth transfer from consumers or producers to the government. This is, of course, essentially a 
restatement of the Coase theory, that with bargaining, and no transactions costs, individuals can 
arrive at an efficient equilibrium.  
Relating the Model to Reality 
  Based on Smith and Yates’ simple model, one might be tempted to argue that if the 
regulatory agency offered individuals the right to both buy or sell permits at the existing market 
price of permits, regulators could look at whether additional permits were being created or 
destroyed, and decide whether the number of permits issued was too high or too low (subject, of 
course, to intertemporal incentive compatibility arguments discussed by Smith and Yates, p. 
188). In this case, assuming no public goods argument (which is the assumption they make in 
their first model), on efficiency grounds if permits are being destroyed, then the number of 
permits issued is too high to be socially optimal and the market price is too low. Similarly, if 
permits are being created, the number of permits is too low. If permits are being neither created 
nor destroyed, then the market price is socially efficient in the sense that Smith and Yates are 
using the term.
3  
  Under these assumptions the regulatory agency could have a useful rule for determining 
the correct number of permits. (In fact, in the case of a symmetric two-sided market, issuing the 
correct number of permits would not be a problem since, using similar arguments to the Coase 
theorem, the quantity of permits would move to an efficient quantity even if the incorrect 
quantity were chosen. Only the distributional effects would be different.)  
  While correct, that view is not especially helpful since that missing market is missing for 
very important reasons. As Smith and Yates note, their simple model is unrealistic and is useful 
for expositional purposes only. Actual markets are made up of multiple individuals and multiple 
firms and there are serious public goods arguments both for individuals who would like to 
increase the number of permits and for individuals who would like to decrease the number of 
permits. The public goods problem is not the only reason that the market in setting quantity of 
permits is missing. Another problem is asymmetric transactions costs, which would likely bias a 
symmetric two-sided market toward individuals wanting to increase the number of permits, since 
firms could act as their agents. A further problem is that pollution generally has geographic-
specific and other characteristics that affect different individuals differently. Such problems 
undermine any argument for establishing a symmetric two-sided market.  
                                                 
3 The concept of a market is a stretch here since there is only one consumer and one firm, who in fact represent the 
producing and consuming side of the same individual. If the individual is buying permits, the quantity was set too 
high; if he is selling, the quantity was set too low.  
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Conclusion 
  Permit markets are becoming better understood as we gain more experience with them. 
As Smith and Yates point out, a major problem of such markets is that it is difficult to determine 
the correct number of permits to create. Thus, had Smith and Yates been correct that regulators 
could gain information about the optimal number of permits to issue from establishing what they 
called two-sided markets, their paper would have been a contribution not only to economic 
pedagogy, but also to applied economic theory. Unfortunately, they are not correct, and the 
answer to their title question “Should consumers be priced out of Pollution-Permit Markets?” is 
not the definite yes that they give, but that ubiquitous “it depends.”  
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Information and Pollution Permit Markets 
David Colander 
In a recent article Smith and Yates (Smith and Yates, 2003) argued that regulators could gain 
additional information about the optimal number of permits to issue from two-sided markets. 
This paper argues that they are incorrect in their assertion because the market they refer to is an 
asymmetric two-sided market in which individuals are only allowed to decrease the number of 
permits. When a symmetric two-sided market is considered, the public good nature of the 
problem makes it unlikely that any useful information can come from a two-sided market. 
 